Abstract. Recent developments in mobile code and embedded systems have led to an increased interest in open platforms, i.e. platforms which enable di erent applications to interact in a dynamic environment. However, the exibility of open platforms presents major di culties for the (formal) veri cation of secure interaction between the di erent applications. To overcome these di culties, compositional veri cation techniques are required. This paper presents a compositional approach to the speci cation and veri cation of secure applet interactions. This approach involves a compositional model of the interface behavior of applet interactions, a temporal logic property speci cation language, and a proof system for proving correctness of property decompositions. The usability of the approach is demonstrated on a realistic smartcard case study.
Introduction
Veri cation techniques for open platforms Open platforms allow di erent software components, possibly originating from di erent issuers, to interact easily in a single environment. Thanks to their exibility, such open platforms are becoming pervasive in modern software for mobile code, but also for embedded devices such as smartcards.
Quite unsurprisingly, the exibility of open platforms raises major di culties when it comes to establishing global properties of their applications. Such properties, which capture the interface behavior of the platform's components, include many common security properties such as \Component B can only access resource R after being authorized by Component A", or \Component A cannot perform action between Component B performing action and Component C performing action ".
Two problems arise with the veri cation of such global properties:
{ the complexity of the platform. In order to reason about the system, one needs to specify the communication mechanisms supported by the platform. These can be intrinsic (e.g. in Java ity modi ers; in JavaCard 2 , with rewalls and secure object sharing mechanisms) and can complicate reasoning substantially; { the availability of the software. In the case of platforms supporting dynamic loading of software, one often would like to establish properties that are preserved when new software is loaded. In particular, this is true for security properties such as con dentiality and integrity. These problems can be tackled by enforcing the desired properties through strict local security checks, as is done e.g. in bytecode veri cation, see e.g. 13] , or in type systems for information ow, see e.g. 17] . However, this requires focusing on a very restricted set of properties, that excludes many useful global properties.
Open platforms for smartcards New generation smartcards such as JavaCards are open platforms that support multiple applications on a single card and postissuance loading of applets (i.e. applications can be loaded on the card after being issued to users). As smartcards are typically used as identity documents and money devices, security issues are particularly at stake, and the need for formal veri cation is widely recognized, as testi ed e.g. by Common Criteria 3 . Despite the advent of on-card bytecode veri cation 14], current technology prevents complex veri cations to be performed on-card, thus applet veri cation needs to be performed o -card, presumably prior to loading the applet on the card. In this setting, one needs to analyze the possible interactions between the applet being loaded and the applets already on the card without having access to the code of the latter.
Compositional veri cation One possible veri cation strategy for programs operating on open platforms consists of:
1. reducing global properties of programs to local properties about their components, using compositional veri cation techniques; 2. verifying local properties of components by standard means, such as modelchecking. Such a strategy can be used to control state-space explosion and has been employed to good e ect to establish the correctness of realistic, industrial-size open distributed telecom systems 9]. The main goal of this paper is to show that such a strategy is also applicable to open platforms such as smartcards. To this end, we develop a framework which allows to reduce global properties to local properties about components. The problem of verifying the local properties is not addressed here, since there are standard algorithmic techniques for this (see e.g. 4]). Our framework for compositional veri cation consists of: { a model of applet interactions that captures, in a language-independent setting, control ow within applets and procedure calls between applets. This model is inspired by 11], and was motivated and presented informally by the present authors in 2]. { a compositional proof system in the style of 16, 7, 9] that is used for proving correctness of property decompositions. This proof system has been proved sound w.r.t. the underlying model in PVS 15] . To illustrate the bene ts of our method, we also detail an example of property decomposition in the setting of an industrial smartcard case study 3].
Contents The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model, specication language and proof system are introduced in Sections 2, 3 and 5 respectively, whereas Section 4 provides a brief overview of the language of patterns. The case study is detailed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes with related and future work.
Program Model
We focus on the control ow in platforms in which procedure or method calls are the primary means for interaction between components. For proving validity of property decompositions we need a model of program behavior which captures the interaction behavior of programs and program components, and over which the formulae of property speci cation languages can be interpreted. Standard models of this kind are provided by labeled transition systems (LTS), where the transition labels denote method invocations and returns. Interaction behavior can then be de ned in an abstract and language independent fashion, following the approach by Jensen et al. 11], as being induced by a transfer/call graph through a set of transition rules. Composition of behaviors is obtained in process algebraic style by using imperfect actions which handshake to produce perfect communications. The program model and its operational semantics have been motivated and described in greater detail (but less formally) in 2].
Model. We formalize the program model we presented in 2]. Intuitively, an applet state represents the un nished calls that have been made from and to an applet. As method calls can cross applet boundaries, both the source and the destination of a call are remembered, to ensure \proper" returning (i.e. to the appropriate callee) from a method call. If intra-procedural execution takes place within an applet, i.e. by following the transfer relation, the changing of the active program point is re ected by changing the last element in the call stack. This is described by the operational semantics below.
De nition 1 (Program Model
Operational Semantics. The behavior of programs is given in terms of labeled transition systems. Two kinds of transition rules are used: (1) applet transition rules, describing state changes in a single applet, and (2) The property speci cation language presented above is rather low-level. To facilitate high-level formal reasoning, we introduce a collection of speci cation patterns, following the approach of the Bandera project 6].
In the context of the present work, the use of speci cation patterns has an additional purpose: as explained in the introduction, we have two di erent kind of veri cation tasks in our framework, namely model-checking the local properties of the individual applets, and proving property decompositions correct. The use of general temporal logic patterns allows us to use di erent veri cation techniques (based on di erent logics) for the di erent tasks. For example, we can model check the local applet properties by translating, as appropriate, the speci cations into CTL (e.g. as input for NuSMV 5]) or LTL (e.g. as input for SPIN 10] ), while we can use the modal -calculus to prove the correctness of the property decomposition, as this is more suitable for the task.
A typical speci cation pattern used to express invariant properties is: 
Proof System
For proving correctness of property decompositions, we develop a Gentzen-style proof system based on the compositional approach advocated by Simpson 16] . This approach has been successfully used for the compositional veri cation of CCS programs 7], and even of complex telecommunications software written in the Erlang programming language 9].
The proof system uses Gentzen style sequents, i.e. proof judgments of the form 1 ; : : : ; n` 1 ; : : : ; n . The intuitive interpretation of such a sequent is that the conjunction of the antecedents implies the disjunction of the consequents, i.e. 1^: : :^ n ) 1 _: : :_ n . Formally, we de ne the building blocks of our proof system as follows.
De nition 6 (Assertion, Sequent). (iv) Sequent ?` is valid if, for all program models M and environments , whenever all assertions in ? are valid for M and then also some assertion in is valid for M and .
Note that wellformedness of program states does not lift to program-state terms in a way which can be captured purely syntactically, and therefore has to be dealt with explicitly in the proof system. We now present, in groups, the proof rules of our proof system. Since many of these are standard, we only show the most interesting ones here; the remaining rules can be found in Appendix B. The side condition \fresh x" appearing in some of the rules means \x does not appear free in the conclusion of the rule". Structural and logical rules. As structural rules, we assume the standard identity, cut and weakening rules of Gentzen-style proof systems. We have rules for the various atomic formula constructs. Equality is handled through standard congruence rules, plus standard rules for freely generated datatypes (for deal- These ordinal variables are examined by a global discharge rule, which checks whether the proof tree constitutes a valid well-founded induction scheme. Informally, the discharge rule applies if (i) every non-axiom leaf of the proof tree is an instance (up to a substitution) of some ancestor sequent in the proof tree, (ii) for each such sequent, this substitution maps some ordinal variable approximating a xed-point formula to an ordinal variable which is assumed to be smaller, and (iii) these separate induction schemes are consistent with each other. For Notice that in each rule two proof obligations arise on the wellformedness of the state. This may seem a heavy proof burden, but almost all these proof obligations can be discharged immediately. It is future work to derive optimized proof rules which result in less proof obligations.
The l.h.s. rules apply when we assume that a certain transition is possible. By the closure condition of the transition semantics, the possible transitions are exactly those inferable by the transition rules, thus these proof rules have to capture the conditions under which we can assume that this transition is possible. ?????! X is possible, one of these rules must have been applied, and thus for one of these rules all conditions must have been satis ed. This is exactly captured by the proof rule (ComPerfL), with explicit wellformedness conditions added. In rule (ComImpL), l?! stands for either l? or l!. 6 Example: Electronic Purse
To illustrate the working of the proof system, we take the electronic purse smartcard example of 3], which we discussed in greater detail (by providing the program model) in 2], and we outline the correctness proof of the decomposition of its speci cation. In this example an electronic purse is presented, which contains three applets: a Purse applet, and two loyalty applets: AirFrance and RentACar, with the standard functionalities. Besides, the Purse keeps a log table of bounded size of all transactions. Loyalties can subscribe to a (paying) logFull service, which signals that the log table is full and entries will be overridden. In the example, AirFrance is subscribed to this service. If it gets a logFull message, it will update its local balance, by asking the entries of the log There is a systematic method of proving validity of such sequents based on stepwise symbolic execution and loop detection. Symbolic execution refers to the process of computing the symbolic next-states of a program-state term (here a P : P j a AF : AF j a RaC : RaC ) guided by the modalities of the formula (here Spec). In this process some parameter terms of the program-state term might change. This requires the assumptions on these parameter terms to be updated. Some of the resulting symbolic next-states might be impossible, for example due to the accumulation of contradicting assumptions about the locality of program points, or because they violate the wellformedness restrictions on program states. Loop detection refers to detecting when a sequent is an instance of some ancestor sequent in the proof tree. This is necessary for checking the discharge condition.
We exemplify the method on the sequent above. First, we unfold the pattern and apply logical rules based on the outermost logical connective of Spec until reaching a box-formula. In this way two subgoals are obtained; we focus on the rst (the correctness proof of the second subgoal will follow the same structure): We consider all possible next states of a P : P ja AF : AF hv 1 ; v LF ija RaC : RaC within the call. In most cases, we detect a loop and immediately can apply the discharge condition, but in the case that the next state is reached because a AF has sent out an external call, we cannot do this. Here we have to use the assumption on a AF , which says that such a call can only be to v GT or v GB .
Thus there are two possible symbolic next states and for both these states we have to show that Always ?ret v1 Spec 0 holds. This is done by showing that in this state Spec 0 holds (either because a P is active, thus a RaC cannot send a message, or because of the speci cation on a RaC , which says that it does not make outgoing calls from within v GB ), and that in all possible next states again Always ?ret v1 Spec 0 holds. Thus, proof search continues in the same way from these states, considering all possible computations, until all branches of the proof tree can be discharged, therewith concluding our proof.
Notice that the construction of the proof is exactly prescribed by the structure of the formula. Therefore we believe that having a tailored proof tool and well-developed proof strategies, will help us to achieve a su ciently high degree of automation in constructing the decomposition correctness proofs.
Conclusion and future work
This paper introduces a language-independent framework for the speci cation and veri cation of secure applet interactions in open platforms. It is shown that the framework can be instantiated to JavaCard and that it allows the decomposition of global properties about applet interactions into local properties of applets, as shown on a realistic case study.
Related work Our program models can alternatively be cast in terms of contextfree processes; for these there exist algorithmic veri cation techniques w.r.t. modal -calculus speci cations 4]. The development of our program model follows earlier work by Jensen et al. 11] which addresses security properties expressible as stack invariants. These form a strict subset of the properties which can be expressed in our framework, but allow for more e cient model checking procedures.
Future work Our primary objective is to complete our work on the proof system by studying completeness and decidability issues for suitable fragments of the logic. This is crucial for providing adequate automated tools for property decomposition. Further, we intend to combine such tools with o -the-shelf model checkers, so that local properties of applets can be checked automatically. We believe that such a combination will provide an e ective environment to address further, more challenging, case studies.
In a di erent line of work, it would be of interest to enhance our model with data { so as to capture properties such as \Action Credit increases the balance of the Purse Component" { and with multi-threading, but the theoretical underpinnings of such extensions remain to be unveiled. 
